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ABSTRACT
The purpose of the present paper is twofold. First, we characterize the Fed’s systematic response
to technology shocks and its implications for U.S. output, hours and inflation. Second, we evaluate the
extent to which those responses can be accounted for by a simple monetary policy rule (including the
optimal one) in the context of a standard business cycle model with sticky prices. Our main results can
be described as follows: First, we detect significant differences across periods in the response of the
economy (as well as the Fed’s) to a technology shock. Second, the Fed’s response to a technology shock
in the Volcker-Greenspan period is consistent with an optimal monetary policy rule. Third, in the
pre-Volcker period the Fed’s policy tended to over stabilize output at the cost of generating excessive
inflation volatility. Our evidence reinforces recent results in the literature suggesting an improvement in
the Fed’s performance.
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Since the seminal work of Taylor (1993), many macroeconomists have shifted their attention to the
analysis of the endogenous component of monetary policy, and its role in shaping the responses
of nominal and real variables to diﬀerent shocks. The contribution of the present paper to that
research program is twofold. First, we study the behavior of the Federal Reserve (Fed) in response
to a speci￿cs o u r c eo f￿uctuations: technology shocks. Second, we evaluate the extent to which
that policy response approximates the optimal one, using a standard dynamic sticky price model
as a reference framework.1
We provide evidence on the economy￿s response to a technology shock that is based on a struc-
tural VAR, estimated using U.S. quarterly data for the period 1954-1998. Following the strategy
adopted in Gal￿ (1999), we identify a technology shock as the only source of the unit root in
labor productivity. We analyze the estimated dynamic responses of a number of real and nominal
variables to that shock, and assess how the observed Fed reaction may have in￿uenced the econ-
omy￿s response. Furthermore, and motivated by recent evidence pointing to signi￿cant changes
over time in the Fed￿s monetary policy rule, we analyze the diﬀerences across two subperiods: the
pre-Volcker period and the more recent Volcker-Greenspan era.2
Our theoretical analysis focuses on three alternative monetary policy rules. First, we derive
and characterize the optimal policy. In the context of our model that policy is the one that fully
stabilizes prices. Second, we derive the equilibrium responses to a technology shock of a number of
variables under such a rule, and compare those responses to the ones generated by two alternative
speci￿cations of monetary policy: a simple Taylor rule and a constant money growth rule. We
then confront the three sets of theoretical responses with the empirical ones, and try to ascertain
which rule￿if any￿ provides a better approximation to the systematic response of the Fed to the
1 Dotsey (1999) emphasizes the role of the systematic component of monetary policy in determining the econ-
omy￿s response to any type of shock.
2 See, e.g. Taylor (1999), Judd and Rudebusch (1999), and Clarida, Gal￿ and Gertler (2000) for evidence of a
regime change around the time Paul Volcker became the Fed￿s chairman.
0supply shocks under consideration.
Our main results can be summarized as follows. First, we detect signi￿cant diﬀerences across
periods in the response of interest rates, prices, and output to a technology shock. Second, the
Fed￿s response to that shock in the Volcker-Greenspan period is consistent with an optimal rule.
Third, in the pre-Volcker period the Fed￿s policy tends to overstabilize output, thus generating ex-
cessive in￿ation volatility. Hence, our evidence reinforces recent results in the literature suggesting
an improvement in the Fed￿s performance.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we derive and characterize
the economy￿s equilibrium under the three rules considered. In section 3 we present our evidence
on the Fed￿s systematic response to technology shocks, and compare the empirical responses with
the theoretical counterparts. Section 4 concludes.
2 Technology Shocks and Monetary Policy in a Sticky Price
Model
2 . 1 AB a s e l i n eS t i c k yP r i c eM o d e l
In this section we lay out a simple version of the Calvo (1983) model with staggered price setting,
which we take as a reference framework for the analysis of monetary policy. Next we describe
brie￿y the main ingredients.3
We assume a continuum of ￿rms, indexed by subscript i ∈ [0,1], each producing a diﬀerentiated
good with a technology
Yt(i)=At Nt(i)
where (log) productivity at ≡ log(At) follows the exogenous process:
∆at = ρ ∆at−1 + εt
with ρ ∈ [0,1). For simplicity, and given our objective, we assume that such variations in aggregate
productivity are the only source of ￿uctuations in the economy. For the sake of simplicity, the
3 A detailed derivation can be found in Woodford (1996) and Yun (1996), among others.
1analysis that follows ignores capital accumulation. As discussed below, most of the qualitative
results stressed in the present paper as well as the implications for optimal monetary policy are
not aﬀected by that simplifying assumption.

























is a consumption index and N denotes hours of work.
The log-linearized Euler equation associated with the consumer￿s problem, combined with the




(rt − Et{πt+1} − rr)+Et{yt+1} (2)
where yt denotes (log) aggregate output, rt is the nominal interest rate, πt+1 i st h er a t eo fi n ￿ation
between t and t +1 ,a n drr ≡−logβ represents the steady state real interest rate.
The labor market is perfectly competitive, with the labor supply schedule associated with the
solution to the consumer￿s problem being given by wt − pt = σ ct + ϕ nt,w h e r ewt denotes the
(log) nominal wage, pt is the (log) aggregate price level, and nt ≡ log(Nt). Hence, all ￿rms face a
common real marginal cost mct = wt − pt − at. Clearing of goods and labor markets implies
mct =( σ + ϕ) yt − (1 + ϕ) at (3)
Each ￿rm faces an isoelastic demand for its product (generated by the solution to the con-
sumer￿s problem), and takes the path of aggregate variables as given. If all ￿rms adjust prices
optimally each period (￿exible prices), the price-marginal cost markup is common across ￿rms,
constant over time, and equal to ε
ε−1. Accordingly, mct = −log ε
ε−1 ≡ mc, for all t. Hence, under
￿exible prices, the equilibrium processes for output, employment, and the expected real rate are
2independent of monetary policy and given by:
y∗
t = γ + ψ at
n∗
t = γ +( ψ − 1) at
rr∗
t = rr + σρψ ∆at
where ψ ≡
1+ϕ
σ+ϕ and γ ≡ mc
σ+ϕ. We refer to the above equilibrium values as the natural levels of
output, employment, and the real interest rate, respectively.
If, on the other hand, ￿rms can adjust prices only infrequently, the markup (and, hence, the
real marginal cost) will no longer be constant. As a result a gap between actual output and its
natural level may emerge. We denote that gap by xt ≡ yt − y∗
t and refer to it as the output gap.
It follows from (3), together with the previous de￿nition, that the output gap will be proportional
the deviation of real marginal cost from its frictionless level, i.e., its level under ￿exible prices.
Formally we have c mct =( σ + ϕ) xt,w h e r ec mct ≡ mct − mc.
The exact form of the equation describing aggregate in￿ation dynamics depends on the way
sticky prices are modeled. Here we follow Calvo (1983), and assume that each ￿rm resets its price
in any given period only with probability 1 − θ, independently of other ￿rms and of the time
elapsed since the last adjustment. Thus, each period a measure 1 − θ of producers reset their
prices, while a fraction θ keep their prices unchanged. In that case, the aggregation of optimal
price-setting decisions can be shown to yield the familiar new Phillips curve:




Finally, we can rewrite equilibrium condition (2) in terms of the output gap and the natural
rate of interest:




(rt − Et{πt+1} − rr∗
t)+Et{xt+1} (5)
Equations (4) and (5), together with a speci￿cation of monetary policy (i.e., of how the interest
rate is determined), describe the equilibrium dynamics of the model economy in the presence of
exogenous variations in aggregate technology. Next we analyze the economy￿s response to such
disturbances under alternative speci￿cations of monetary policy.
2.2 The Dynamic Eﬀects of Technology Shocks
In this section we consider three alternative speci￿cations of the systematic component of mon-
etary policy: the optimal monetary policy, a simple Taylor rule, and a constant money growth
rule (henceforth, a money rule). Our analysis focuses on how the nature of that systematic pol-
icy component aﬀects the equilibrium responses of diﬀerent variables to a permanent shock to
technology.
2.2.1 Optimal Monetary Policy
The model economy described above may be plagued by a variety of distortions (market power,
valuable money, etc.). We follow a number of recent papers in the literature and maintain the
assumption that all such distortions, with the exception of the existence of nominal rigidities, have
already been corrected by means of appropriate non-monetary interventions.5 Accordingly, the
natural level of output and employment coincide with their eﬃcient levels. In such an environ-
ment monetary policy should aim at replicating the allocation associated with the ￿exible price
equilibrium. Hence, the monetary authority focuses on correcting a distortion that is monetary
in nature. The optimal policy requires that
xt = πt =0
5 See, e.g., Rotemberg and Woodford (1999), among others.
4all t. While the presence of other distortions (in addition to staggered price setting) may lead to
deviations from the previous policy, recent analyses based on calibrated models have suggested
that those deviations are likely to be quantitatively small.6
Our baseline model turns out to have a simple and appealing property: the allocation associated
with the ￿exible price equilibrium can be exactly replicated with an appropriate policy, at least
under the assumption that productivity can be observed contemporaneously by the monetary
authority. Using (5), such allocation can be implemented in practice using the interest rate rule
rt = rr + σρψ ∆at + φπ πt
for any φπ > 1.7 Hence, the equilibrium behavior of the nominal rate rt ( a sw e l la st h er e a lr a t e
rrt) can be represented by the process
rt =( 1− ρ) rr + ρ rt−1 + σρψ εt
The equilibrium response of output and employment will match that of their natural levels:
∆yt = ρ ∆yt−1 + ψε t
∆nt = ρ ∆nt−1 +( ψ − 1) εt
Thus, as in the ￿exible price case, a permanent technology shock leads to a proportional change
in output under the optimal policy, while the sign of the response of employment depends on the
strength of the wealth eﬀect, as determined by the size of σ. The lack of strong evidence of a unit
root in hours in postwar U.S. data suggests a value for σ (and hence ψ) equal or close to one.
That property motivates the calibration used below.
Notice also that the equilibrium behavior of the interest rate depends on the persistence of
productivity growth. Thus, when productivity is a pure random walk (ρ =0 ) both nominal and
real interest rates remain constant.
6 See, e.g., Goodfriend and King (2001) and Woodford (2001) for an extended discussion of the case for price
stability and its robustness to the presence of a variety of distortions.
7 T h ep r e s e n c eo ft h ei n ￿ation term with a coeﬃcient greater then unity guarantees the uniqueness of the
equilibrium. See, e.g., Woodford (2000) for a detailed discussion.
5While the above analysis has been restricted, for the sake of exposition, to a model economy
with labor as the only productive input, it is important to realize that allowing for capital accu-
mulation would not aﬀect the basic principle for optimal monetary policy principle emphasized
above, namely, the desirability of price-level stabilization. In the presence of capital, however, the
equilibrium dynamics for output, hours, and the interest rate under the optimal policy will diﬀer
somewhat from the ones derived above. In particular, their representation will include an addi-
tional state variable (the capital stock), and will correspond (by construction) to the equilibrium
dynamics of a standard stochastic growth model with a nonstationary technology.8
2.2.2 A Simple Taylor Rule
Suppose that the central bank follows the rule
rt = rr + φπ πt + φx xt (6)
i.e., the nominal rate responds systematically to the contemporaneous values of in￿ation and the
output gap. This is a version of the rule put forward by John Taylor as a good characterization
of U.S. monetary policy, and analyzed in numerous recent papers.9
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and Ω ≡ 1
σ+φx+κφπ.
8 See, e.g., King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1996).
9 See Taylor (1993, 1999).
6As is well known, there exists a range of values for coeﬃcients (φx,φπ) such that the equilibrium
is indeterminate, giving rise to the possibility of sunspot ￿uctuations. If we restrict ourselves to
non-negative values of φx and φπ, a necessary and suﬃcient condition for the previous dynamical
system to have a unique stationary solution (and, hence, to have well de￿ned responses to a
technology shock) is given by10
κ (φπ − 1) + (1 − β) φx > 0
















 + Γ εt
where Γ ≡ [Γx,Γπ]0 =[ I − ρAT]
−1BT. Given the equilibrium path for xt it is straightforward to
solve for the corresponding trajectories of output and employment:
yt = γ + xt + ψ at
nt = γ + xt +( ψ − 1) at
with the equilibrium behavior of the nominal rate given by (6). Notice that only in the case of a
random walk process for technology (ρ =0 ), will the Taylor rule supports the optimal allocation
(for BT =0 ,i nt h a tc a s e ) .
The line with squares in Figure 1 represents the equilibrium responses of diﬀerent variables
to a technology shock under a simple Taylor rule. We calibrate the in￿ation coeﬃcient using the
value suggested in Taylor (1993), namely, φπ =1 .5. The output gap coeﬃcient φx is set to zero.11
For comparison purposes we also show the corresponding responses under the optimal policy,
10 See, e.g., Bullard and Mitra (2001).
11 As argued by Gal￿ (1999), the notion of output gap used in conventional Taylor rules does not generally
correspond to the model-based concept of output gap used here. The latter, de￿ned as the deviation of output
from its natural level, is an unobservable variable, which motivates its omission from any simple rule. None of our
results hinge on that assumption, however.
7represented by the line with triangles. The remaining parameters were set at the following values:
σ =1 , β =0 .99, ϕ =1 , ρ =0 .2,a n dθ =0 .75.
We observe that under the assumed Taylor rule output and employment increase beyond their
natural levels in response to a positive technology shock, which leads to a temporary rise in
in￿ation. Hence, the policy response implied by the Taylor rule appears not to be suﬃciently
contractionary. This is re￿ected in the fact that the path of the real rate under that rule lies
uniformly below the path associated with the optimal policy.
Notice, however, that the deviations from the optimal policy are quantitatively small. Further-
more, they could be reduced further by choosing a more aggressive response (higher values for φπ
and φx). Yet, it should be clear that no ￿nite values for those parameters could possibly replicate
the optimal responses. The reason is straightforward: supporting the optimal response requires
that prices remain stable and that the real rate increases. Accordingly, the nominal interest rate
should also increase. But the rule will not generate a rise in the nominal rate unless a deviation
from the optimal response occurs (in the form of positive in￿ation or output gap).12
2.2.3 A Monetary Targeting Rule
Suppose next that the monetary authority targets the rate of growth of the money supply. For-
mally,
mt − mt−1 = γm (7)
where m denotes the quantity of money in circulation, expressed in logs. Henceforth, and without
loss of generality we set γm =0 , which is consistent with zero in￿ation in the steady state.
The demand for money holdings is assumed to take a conventional form:
mt − pt = yt − η rt
12 It would take setting either φπ or φx equal to in￿nity to achieve the optimal allocation. Such a rule would
potentially lead to huge instrument-instability: any small deviation of in￿ation or the output gap from zero (perhaps
resulting from small measurement errors or imperfect credibility) might imply in￿nite changes in the rate. The lack
of credibility of such a policy might be more than warranted since it would be inconsistent with the zero-bound on
nominal rates.
8Letting m∗
t ≡ mt−pt−ψat we can rewrite the money demand in terms of stationary variables
only:
m∗
t = xt − η rt
Furthermore, it follows from the de￿nition of m∗
t and (7) that
m∗
t−1 = m∗
t + πt + ψ ∆at
The equilibrium dynamics are now represented by the system:
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The line with squares in Figure 2 represents the equilibrium responses of diﬀerent variables to a
technology shock, under the assumption that the central bank keeps the money supply unchanged.
Again, the line with triangles displays the responses under the optimal policy.
A comparison of the responses under the two rules makes clear that, in the face of a favorable
productivity shock, money targeting implies a monetary stance that is too tight: the resulting
path for the real interest rate lies uniformly above the optimal one. As a consequence, output
does not increase as much as would be eﬃcient, and employment declines.
9Notice also that the nominal rate remains unchanged under constant money growth. That
result, however, is not general: it hinges on our speci￿c calibration of σ. More generally, constant
money growth implies that the interest rate is given by:13











Hence, if utility is logarithmic in consumption, the nominal rate is constant, and independent
of output dynamics.14 Furthermore, it is easy to show that constant money growth will generally
lead to a suboptimal response of the economy to a technology shock. The reason is simple: the
optimal response requires that ∆yt = ψ∆at and rt = rr + σρψ ∆at, for all t.B u t t h e l a t t e r
conditions are not consistent with (8), except for a particular con￿guration of parameter values.15
How signi￿cant are the deviations from the optimal responses that follow from adherence to a
strict money targeting rule under our calibrated model ? The results shown in Figure 2 suggest
that they are far from negligible: thus, a one percent shock to productivity leads to a change of
about 150 b a s i sp o i n t si nt h er a t eo fi n ￿ation, and more than 50 b a s i sp o i n t si ne m p l o y m e n ta n d
the output gap (the three variables remain constant under the optimal policy). On that basis one
should conclude that a money targeting rule is likely to be less desirable than a simple Taylor
rule, at least when technology shocks are the dominant source of ￿uctuations.
3 The Fed￿s Response to Technology Shocks: Evidence
This section provides evidence on the Fed￿s systematic response to technology shocks and its
implications for U.S. output, hours and in￿ation. We also discuss the extent to which those
responses are consistent with any of the rules considered in the previous section.
13 To see this, diﬀerence the money demand equation (imposing ∆mt =0 ), combine it with (2), and solve the
resulting diﬀerence equation forward.
14 The reader may notice the connection of that result with the literature on the liquidity eﬀect. A detailed
analysis along those lines can be found in Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1997) and AndrØs, L￿pez-Salido,
and VallØs (1999).
15 See Gal￿ (2000) for a more detailed analysis of the deviations from optimality implied by money targeting as
well as other policy rules.
103.1 Identi￿cation and Estimation
The empirical eﬀects of technology shocks are determined through the estimation of a structural
VAR. The latter is partially-identi￿ed: given our limited objective we do not attempt to identify
sources of ￿uctuations other than exogenous variations in technology. Our identifying restriction
is that only technology shocks may have a permanent eﬀect on the level of labor productivity, as
originally proposed in Gal￿ (1999). That restriction is satis￿ed by a broad range of business cycle
models, under standard assumptions.
Our VAR model contains four variables: labor productivity, hours, the real interest rate and
in￿ation. We specify labor productivity in log ￿rst diﬀerences, in accordance with the maintained
hypothesis of a unit root in that variable. Hours are measured in log deviations from a ￿tted
linear trend. Both the real rate and in￿ation enter in levels.16
Our hours series is the log of total employee hours in nonagricultural establishments. Labor
productivity was constructed subtracting the previous variable to the log of GDP. Both, hours and
GDP were normalize by working age population. The nominal interest rate is the three-month
Treasury bill rate and the price is measured with the log of the CPI. All the series used are
quarterly and were drawn from CITIBASE.
Our analysis covers the sample period 1954:I-1998:III. A number of authors have argued that
U.S. monetary policy has experienced important structural changes over that period. The existing
evidence suggests splitting the sample into two subperiods: the pre-Volcker years and the more
recent Volcker-Greenspan era.17 In addition, we remove the period 79:III-82:II from our analysis,
because of the unusual operating procedures that were eﬀective during that episode.18
Table 1 reports some summary statistics on the estimated reduced form VAR system (with
four lags). The third and fourth columns of the Table report the p-values for the null that the
16 We have also estimated the VAR model with ￿rst diﬀerenced hours and in￿ation. None of the main qualitative
results reported below were aﬀected.
17 See, e.g. Taylor (1993) and Clarida, Gal￿ and Gertler (2000).
18 See Bernanke and Mihov (1998) for formal evidence of the idiosincracy of that period.
11coeﬃcients on the dependent variable￿s own lags (third column), or those associated with the
remaining variables (fourth column) are zero. The next two columns report the R2 and the
Durbin-Watson statistics for each equation and subsample.
In order to assess the plausibility of our identi￿cation scheme we compare our estimated tech-
nology shocks with the alternative measure constructed by Basu, Fernald and Kimball (BFK,
1998) using conventional growth accounting methods. The latter generalizes the Solow residual
by allowing for increasing returns, imperfect competition, and variable input utilization rates.
The BFK measure is only available until 1989 on an annual basis; hence, and for the sake of
comparison, we annualize our VAR-based technology shock measure (by averaging across quarters
within a calendar year), and adjust the sample period accordingly. Figure 3 displays both the
VAR-based and the BFK technology shock measures. While far from being identical, the series
display a strong positive comovement which is apparent in the ￿gure, with an associated correla-
tion coeﬃcient of 0.59. Given that the methodologies used to construct both series are unrelated,
we view the previous evidence as reinforcing the plausibility of our identi￿cation scheme.
Next we describe the evidence on the eﬀects of technology shocks and the associated policy
response, starting with the most recent subperiod.
3.2 The Volcker-Greenspan Era
Figure 4 displays, for the 1982:3-1998:3 period, the estimated response of a number of variables to
a positive technology shock, together with associated two standard errors con￿dence interval. The
size of the shock is normalized to one standard deviation. The Figure also shows the corresponding
impulse-responses under the optimal policy.19 Figure 5 supplements that evidence by displaying
the 95% acceptance interval for the null hypothesis of a zero response of all horizons for hours
and in￿ation, together with the estimated responses themselves.20 That null corresponds to the
19 In order to match the observed response of productivity as closely as possible, the optimal responses shown
in the Figure are constructed under the assumption of a random walk process for technology, with the size of the
shock chosen so that the implied long run response of productivity matches the estimated one.
20 The darker bars represent the point estimates of the impulse responses and the lighter bars represent a – 2
standard deviations con￿dence intervals.
12optimal policy outcome in our model.
In Figure 4, we observe an impact jump in the level of productivity of about 0.3 percent. That
variable stabilizes at slightly lower level later on. The output response is of a similar magnitude and
sign. As a result, hours are hardly aﬀected by the shock even though the point estimates suggest
a delayed positive eﬀect, but one which is quantitatively very small. Similar muted responses can
be observed for in￿ation and interest rates (both nominal and real). Thus, while the estimated
impact eﬀect on real interest rate is slightly positive, we cannot reject the null of a zero response
at all horizons for both hours and in￿ation, as shown in Figure 5. The latter result suggests that
the Fed￿s response to technology shocks in the Volcker-Greenspan period is consistent with the
optimal one, as implied by our simple sticky price model.21
3.3 The Pre-Volcker Period
Figures 6 and 7 display the corresponding evidence for the pre-Volcker period (1954:I-1979:II).
In Figure 6, the pro￿le of the estimated response of productivity suggests the presence of some
positive autocorrelation in its ￿rst diﬀerence, in contrast with the near random walk behavior
observed in the Volcker-Greenspan period. Accordingly, the responses under the optimal policy
that are also displayed in Figure 6 are based on a calibration of the technology process that seeks
to mimick the estimated productivity response.22
Notice that the initial output response is slightly negative; only after ￿ve quarters the eﬀect
becomes positive and keeps building up gradually. The response of hours on impact is signi￿cantly
negative and quite large; that eﬀect is reversed only after two years.23 The existence of a large
deviation between those responses and the ones associated with the optimal policy is clearly
apparent. In particular, the persistent negative output gap that arises in the wake of the shock
is behind the negative eﬀect on in￿ation, which contrasts with the requirement of price stability
21 As discussed in the previous section, and given our assumption of a random walk process for technology, that
optimal response could indeed be supported by a Taylor rule.
22 To approximate the observed path of productivity we set ρ =0 .7 in our calibrated model.
23 Similar ￿ndings were obtained by Gal￿ (1999) and Basu, Fernald and Kimball (1998).
13implied by the optimal policy. Formal evidence of the signi￿cance of the deviations in hours and
in￿ation from their optimal path is shown in Figure 7.
Underlying those results is the response of real interest rate. The latter lies above the optimal
response at most horizons which might explain the gap between the actual and optimal output
responses. Even though the nominal rate is shown to decline in response to the shock, the size of
the reduction falls short that of in￿ation, which translates into a persistently higher real rate. In
other words, changes in nominal rate are insuﬃcient to counteract the eﬀect of technology shock
on in￿ation.24
We ￿nd it worth stressing here that the allowance for capital accumulation would hardly help
reconcile the estimated response of hours for the pre-Volcker period with one consistent with the
optimal policy. Indeed, for standard calibrations of the capital-augmented model, the response of
hours to a technology shock has the opposite sign to the one estimated for that period (i.e., the
model predicts that hours should increase in response to a positive technology shock).25
A comparison of the estimated responses for the pre-Volcker period and those generated by the
money rule (see Figures 2 and 4) may be suggestive of some qualitative similarities. In particular,
both imply an excessively tight policy in response to a positive technology shock, which tends to
destabilize hours and in￿ation (while over-stabilizing output). In order to assesss empirically the
plausibility that the Fed followed a monetary targeting rule (conditional on technology shocks) we
have also estimated our VAR for the pre-Vocker period including M1 and M2 growth as additional
variables. Figure 8 displays the estimated response of those monetary aggregates (in growth rates
and levels) to our identi￿ed technology shock. As the Figure clearly shows, we detect a signi￿cant
deviation from a policy that sought to insulate the path of monetary aggregates from the eﬀects
of the shock. That evidence thus calls into question the tentative interpretation given above,
24 This is consistent with the estimates of the unconditional interest rates rule for the same period obtained by
Clarida, Gal￿ and Gertler (2000).
25 Nevertheless, it is possible to generate a short run decrease in hours in the face of a positive technology shock
under a calibration of preferences implying a suﬃciently strong wealth eﬀect (i.e., a high σ). See, e.g., Rotemberg
and Woodford (1996).
14and is not in disaccord with descriptions of monetary policy in the pre-Volcker period as one
characterized by frequent misses of monetary targets.26
4 Conclusions
I nt h i sp a p e rw eh a v ee s t i m a t e dt h eF e d ￿ ss y s t e m a t ic response to technology shocks and its impli-
cations for U.S. output, hours and in￿ation. The analysis of that evidence allows us to evaluate
the extent to which the Fed has sought to stabilize prices in response to such shocks, as would
be prescribed by the optimal policy in an environment in which the presence of staggered price
setting is the main distortion to be corrected by the monetary authority. Our key results can be
summarized as follows. First, we detect signi￿cant diﬀerences across periods in the response of the
economy (as well as the Fed￿s) to a technology shock. Second, the Fed￿s response to a technology
shock in the Volcker-Greenspan period appears to be consistent with a rule that seeks to stabilize
prices and the output gap. Third, estimates for the pre-Volcker period suggest that the Fed￿s
policy tended to over-stabilize output, thus generating excess volatility in in￿ation. Our evidence
reinforces recent results in the literature suggesting an improvement over the postwar period in
the way the Fed has conducted monetary policy.
26 See, e.g., Meulendyke (1990).
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17Table 1. Estimated VAR Model: Summary Statistics
Equation Own Lags Other Lags R2 DW
Labor Productivity Pre-Volcker 0.02 0.00 0.49 1.97
Volcker-Greenspan 0.20 0.15 0.43 1.92
Hours Pre-Volcker 0.00 0.20 0.94 1.98
Volcker-Greenspan 0.00 0.01 0.96 1.95
Real Interest Rate Pre-Volcker 0.30 0.20 0.60 1.96
Volcker-Greenspan 0.00 0.03 0.89 1.96
In￿ation Pre-Volcker 0.00 0.00 0.95 1.99
Volcker-Greenspan 0.00 0.60 0.90 1.95
Note: Values in the third and fourth columns are p-values for the F tests. The Pre-
Volcker period corresponds to 1954:2-1979:3; and the Volcker-Greenspan period corre-
sponds to 1982:4-1998:4.
18 
    Figure 1. The Dynamic Effects of Technology Shocks 
Optimal Policy versus Taylor Rule 
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Note: Response to a permanent increase in total factor productivity. Lines 
with circles correspond to the responses under the optimal policy. Lines with 
triangles represent the responses under the Taylor rule described in the text. 
 
 
 Figure 2. The Dynamic Effects of Technology Shocks 
Optimal Policy versus Monetary Targeting Rule 
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Note: Response to a permanent increase in total factor productivity. Lines 
with circles correspond to the responses under the optimal policy. Lines with 
triangles represent the responses under a constant money growth rule.  
Figure 3. VAR-based versus BFK Technology Shocks 
 
 











Note: The solid line represents the estimated technology sh ock  implied by 
the VAR. The dashed line corresponds to the technology shock series 










































































































Note: Estimated impulse-response functions to a technology shock for the 
Volcker-Greenspan period, with corresponding 95% confidence intervals. The 




 Figure 5. Testing the Optimality Hypothesis 
Volcker-Greenspan Period 
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Note: Dark bars show the estimated impulse-responses of each variable to a 
technology shock for the Volcker-Greenspan period.  White bars  are the 













 Figure 6. The Dynamic Effects of Technology Shocks 
Pre-Volcker Period 
productivity






















































































































Note: Estimated impulse-response functions to a technology shock for the 
pre-Volcker period, with the corresponding 95% confidence intervals. The 
line with circles represents the  corresponding responses under the optimal 
policy. 
 
 Figure 7. Testing the Optimality Hipótesis 
Pre-Volcker Period 
hours























Note: Dark bars show the estimated impulse-responses of each variable to a 
technology shock for the pre-Volcker period.  White bars are t he 














Figure 8. Responses of Monetary Aggregates to  

























































































Note: Estimated impulse-responses of M1 and M2 to a  technology shock for 
the pre-Volcker period, with the corresponding 95% confidence intervals. 